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第15巻
飯川 遥、池田 開、本田 茜吏、神崎 祥輝 Haruka Iikawa, Kai Ikeda, Senri Honda, Shoki Kanzaki『心の概念』の再定位―理由論の観点から―
Reorientation of The Concept of Mind: Toward the Contemporary Perspective on Reasons for Action
2023年06月 発行
[ 要旨 ]
Gilbert Ryle は『心の概念』のなかで心的言明の使用を傾向性の帰属とみなし、それによって行為を説明することを「原因」とは区別された「理由」による説明であるとした。現代でも、行為の理由の概念は盛んに論じられている。本稿は Ryle の立場をそのような現代の理由論の文脈に位置づけ、その観点から再評価することを試みる。現代では大きく、行為の理由を行為者の心的状態であるとみなす心理主義と、それに反対する反心理主義に分かれる。反心理主義の代表的な立場は行為の理由を事実であるとみなす。Ryle の立場はそれらのいずれとも区別され、独自の利点を持っている。しかしその立場には現代的観点からは決定的な限界がある。現代の理由論では行為の理由は規範理由・動機づけ理由・説明理由の３種類に区別される。とくに動機づけ理由は行為者が行為を選択する際の考慮事項になるという意味で行為を導く理由であるとされる。Ryle の立場は行為の理由のこの側面を説明するリソースをもたないのである。Ryle の道具立てを維持しつつ、それを動機づけ理由の説明へ拡張できるかどうかは将来の探究にかかっている。
[ Abstract ]
In The Concept of Mind, Gilbert Ryle argues that mental statements attribute dispositions to agents to explain their actions. This explanation by disposition is not by “causes,” but by “reasons.” Reason for action is also one of the central topics of the contemporary philosophy of action. This study aims to reevaluate The Concept of Mind from this contemporary perspective, according to which there are two main camps: psychologism and anti-psychologism. Psychologism takes reasons for action as the mental states of the agents. In contrast, a representative version of anti-psychologism, factualism, argues that the reasons are facts rather than mental states. The Rylian position, as reconstructed in this paper, is distinct from either of those two camps and has advantages. Ryle’s unique conception of disposition considers it as “inference tickets.” They are not things that occupy spatio-temporal positions but allow people to infer the causes of events or predict their occurrences. The Rylian position can use this tool to partially accommodate both the intuitions that support psychologism and those of anti-psychologism while maintaining the monistic principle. However, it also has critical limitations from the contemporary perspective. In the contemporary debate, three kinds of reasons are distinguished: normative, motivating, and explanatory. Especially motivating reasons are said to guide an action because they are considerations the agent considers when choosing the action. The Rylian position lacks the resources to capture this aspect of reasons for action. Ryle’s disposition as “inference tickets” only enables us to infer causes of actions or predictions of them, but it cannot guide them. In other words, Ryle’s “reasons” are just explanatory rather than motivating. It is up to future exploration to maintain the toolkit of Ryle and extend it to the explanation of motivating reasons.